where the logical constant on the right-hand side of each biconditional clause is understood as subject to the laws of intuitionistic logic. 2 The only other principle in play in Dummett's discussion is (+) A iff Tr(A), which, as he notes, the anti-realist is likely to accept. Here is the dilemma. Dummett's inductive characterization of truth falls prey to the same problem it was meant to solve. The lesson is that Dummett has not quite put is finger on the source of the problem.
One might object that we simply need to treat ‡ as non-transitive. But this has not yet been argued for. And it would not be very interesting simply to suppose the nontransitivity of ‡, having no reason other than the threat of the revised Fitch paradox to 5 Strictly, the necessity of both anti-realism and (+) gives us the necessity of A AE ‡K(A), which gives us ‡A AE ‡ ‡K(A).
motivate the supposition. Pending further discussion, the supposition of non-transitivity is ad hoc.
Turning to the second horn of the dilemma, it may be objected that 'K(B)' is to be treated as a non-basic statement, in which case a supplementary clause is owed to the reader.
Which constructive condition explains the truth of 'K(B)'? Whatever it is, it is not ruled out a priori that the clause will have as a consequence the KK thesis:
After all, if 'K(B)' is constructively true (i.e., if there is a finite and surveyable discourse that verifies 'it is known that B'), it is arguable that this can be turned into a constructive verification of 'KK(B)' (i.e., there is a finite and surveyable discourse that verifies 'it is known that it is known that B'). Further discussion is required to establish the validity of the KK thesis. The suggestion here is merely that it is not, for the constructive anti-realist, an implausible commitment.
It should also be noted that standardly the anti-realist takes ' ‡K(A)' to be factive. Once again we discover a version of the paradox that Dummett's inductive characterization fails to block. Importantly, this version treats 'K(B)' as a non-basic statement. Let us suppose (for our primary reductio) that there is an undecided statement:
This is an exceedingly modest assumption. In fact, it is intuitionistically weaker that the non-omniscience thesis, A & ¬KA, appearing in the Fitch paradoxes. If line 1 is true, then some instance of it is true:
(2) ¬KA & ¬K¬A.
Since line 2 does not violate Tennant's restriction (i.e., K(¬KA & ¬K¬A) is not selfcontradictory), we may apply anti-realism to it. It follows from anti-realism that it is possible to know 2:
Now let the anti-realist suppose for reductio that it is known that A is undecided:
Knowing a conjunction entails knowing each of the conjuncts. Therefore,
Applying principle (*) to each of the conjuncts gives us
Now notice that the truths at w2 are consistent with what is known at w1, so w2 is epistemically accessible from w1. Moreover, the truths at w3 are consistent with what is known at w2, so w3 is accessible from w2. Nonetheless, w3 is not accessible from w1, since there is a truth at w3 that contradicts something that is known at w1. So epistemic possibility is not transitive. Resting only on the assumption of anti-realism, which the anti-realist takes to be known, line 7 is now known:
But then, by (*), it is epistemically impossible to know that A is undecided: Since anti-realism is taken to be a necessary thesis, it must be admitted by the anti-realist that, necessarily, there are no undecided statements:
Line 11 says, necessarily, no statement is such that it and its negation are not known.
Denying in this way that there is an undecided statement boasts of a kind of epistemic completeness that we are in no position to endorse a priori. After all, it is more likely that we will leave some stones unturned. Denying undecidedness in favor of epistemic completeness is bad enough, but things are worse. We see that anti-realism (a necessary thesis) entails the necessity of that completeness. But whether a statement is known is often a contingent matter. And so, whether such statements are undecided is a contingent matter as well.
8 Percival (1990) provides an analogous criticism against a defence proposed in Williamson (1988 Consider the left conjunct (i.e., "it is known that A is unknown"). Upon the development of a constructive interpretation of the knowledge operator, it may turn out that 'knowing that A is unknown' entails 'it is known that ¬A'. Formally, (**) If K¬KA, then K¬A.
In that case, the left conjunct of 5 would contradict the right conjunct.
But there are clear counterexamples to (**). Let 'A' state that there is a particular fossil buried in a particular remote location, and suppose that we do not know whether A.
And suppose that astronomers have learned that the sun just went supernova and that we have seven minutes before the destruction of the Earth and all its inhabitants. In that situation we may know that A is not known (by anyone ever) without knowing ¬A. It would be crazy to think that A is false (i.e., the fossil is not there), just because the explosion of the which ‡ operates on epistemic statements. If a restriction strategy can be vindicated, this will be known only after we have formally analysed the anti-realist's notion of possibility. 
